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Abstract—On-body devices are an intrinsic part of the
Internet-of-Things (IoT) vision to provide human-centric services.
These on-body IoT devices are largely embedded devices that
lack a sophisticated user interface to facilitate traditional Pre-
Shared Key based security protocols. Motivated by this real-
world security vulnerability, this paper proposes SecureTag, a
system designed to add defense in depth against active attacks
by integrating physical layer (PHY) information with upper-layer
protocols. The underpinning of SecureTag is a signal processing
technique that extracts the peculiar propagation characteristics
of creeping waves to discern on-body devices. Upon overhear-
ing a suspicious transmission, SecureTag initiates a PHY-based
challenge-response protocol to mitigate attacks. We implement
our system on different commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) wear-
ables and a smartphone. Extensive experiments are conducted
in a lab, apartments, malls, and outdoor areas, involving 12
volunteer subjects of different age groups, to demonstrate the
robustness of our system. Results show that our system can
mitigate 96.13% of active attack attempts while triggering false
alarms on merely 5.64% of legitimate traffic.
Index Terms—Creeping waves, on-body IoT, cross-layer design,
active attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
The vision of Internet-of-Things (IoT) has raised billions
of dollars and is taking the center stage in the 5th generation
wireless systems (5G). An essential part of the IoT vision is
to deliver human-centric services by sensing users’ biometrics
and activities by on-body smart devices. The minimalist design
paradigm of IoT appears to be a double-edge sword: it opens
up a range of possibilities for ultra low-power communica-
tions, but makes the communication vulnerable to malicious
attacks. Recent works have shown that wireless connectivity
can be compromised to send unauthorized commands to make
embedded IoT devices malfunctioning [1], [2].
Basically, IoT devices are low-end embedded devices that
lacks sophisticated user interface to facilitate traditional Pre-
Shared Key (PSK) security protocols. Recent advances lever-
age auxiliary channels [3]–[7] to secure wireless links. They
adopt special sensors, such as accelerometers and light sensors,
or some dedicated hardware, and thus can only support a
limited portion of today’s IoT devices. One easy solution to
apply these ideas to general devices is adding a dedicated
sensor to each device, which, however, would be expensive:
it requires wearable device manufacturers to undertake major
hardware investments and also increases the hardware cost of
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Fig. 1. Illustration of on- and off-body radio propagation. On-body propaga-
tion is dominated by creeping waves.
the devices. We believe that it is essential for the security
solution to fully support versatile IoT devices to maximize
the chance of its widespread acceptance.
The dynamism of the wireless channel and the special prop-
agation waves induced by the human body present an exciting
opportunity: we can leverage the propagation information to
extract distinct patterns that discern legitimate on-body IoT
devices from attackers from afar. To this end, this paper
presents SecureTag, which exploits radio propagation fea-
tures obtainable in commercial wireless chips to continuously
authenticate and secure on-body IoT devices. SecureTag is a
cross-layer design to enhance wireless security by defending
against active attacks which inject a frame into the network
that lead to a denial-of-service state or a protocol deadlock.
SecureTag employs a propagation feature based proactive
protocol to authenticate the communication link and mitigate
active attacks.
The key enabling technique in SecureTag is to construct a
propagation signature that can identify on-body IoT devices.
Our insight is that on-body propagation is dominated by
creeping waves diffracted from human tissue and trapped
along the body’s surface [8]–[10], while the radio waves of
general off-body links are mainly composed of direct line-
of-sight (LOS) and multi-path propagations, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. The channel variations of creeping waves differ from
off-body links in that they are less sensitive to environmental
dynamics (multi-path and shadowing fading) and transmitter-
receiver (Tx-Rx) distance changes (LOS path loss) [8], [11],
but are more sensitive body motions. Thus, we can leverage
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2the distinct features of creeping waves to identify on-body
devices.
To realize the above idea, we entail the following chal-
lenges.
1) How to exploit radio propagation features without any
hardware changes to low-end IoT devices? Most IoT links are
low-rate and energy-efficient, making it inapplicable for them
to extract signal propagation features based on fine-grained
channel information or even a large antenna array [12]. To
overcome this predicament, we leverage creeping waves’ pe-
culiar time-domain features that lie in commercial embedded
device obtainable received signal strength (RSS). In particular,
we extract variations caused by different factors by decom-
posing RSS traces into multiple independent components, and
then exploit the distinct variation features of creeping waves
to identify an on-body link.
2) How to accurately extract the desired features when
signal propagation is largely affected by body motion? On-
body motion severely affects creeping paths and shadowing
fading, which may overwhelm the variations caused by other
factors. SecureTag therefore takes a two-step approach to
obtain the desired features. First, SecureTag makes an early
stop to extract the direct path loss variations based on temporal
and spectral properties. Then, SecureTag exploits variation
patterns to find signal fluctuation periods that are likely caused
by body motion, and eliminate these periods to obtain residual
variations caused by environmental dynamics.
Summary of results. We implement SecureTag on a wear-
able system consisting of a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone
and multiple COTS wearables, including two smart wristbands
(Fitbit Force and LifeSense Mambo) and a smart waistband
(Lumo Back). On the whole, SecureTag mitigates 96.13% of
active attack attempts while triggering false alarms on merely
5.64% of legitimate traffic for 12 volunteer subjects in different
indoor and outdoor environments. SecureTag can protect on-
body IoT devices that are placed at the neck, wrist, and waist
by preventing 97.74% ± 0.74% of active attacks with a false
alarm rate of 7.29%± 2.26%.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows.
• We show that the RSS traces from COTS wearables can
be utilized to recognize wearers. Compared to previous
special-sensor based approaches, its major advantage is
that it can be applied to different types of wearables
without any hardware changes.
• We develop SecureTag, an on-body detection framework
that can run on wearable systems consisting of COTS
smartphones and wearables. The framework exploits dis-
tinct creeping wave propagation features to discern on-
body devices.
• We test our system on 12 volunteer subjects with over 76-
hour traces collected, and conduct extensive experiments
in a variety of environments, including a lab, apartments,
malls, and outdoor areas. The results show the effec-
tiveness of our system over different subjects, wearing
positions, and environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
investigates the threat model and the propagation characteris-
tics of on-body IoT devices, followed by the system design
overview in Section III. Section III-A and III-B elaborate the
technical details. Section IV and V present experiment results,
followed by discussion in Section VI and literature review in
Section VII. Section VIII conclude the paper.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we first discuss the potential threats to on-
body IoT communications. Next, we investigate the features
of on-body radio propagation, which motivates the design of
SecureTag.
A. Threat Model
We consider attackers that are not placed on the same human
body as legitimate IoT devices. The attackers can be carried
by another user or placed somewhere nearby to launch active
attacks. We only consider active attacks, as in most cases
attackers must transmit to penetrate the network. Note that
SecureTag does not provide any protection against passive
attacks, i.e., eavesdropping attacks. We make no assumptions
about the transmission power or antenna direction of the
attackers. The attackers may have breached existing security
protocol and have obtained the authentication credentials dur-
ing device association.
B. Characterizing On-Body Radio Propagation
The human body is mainly a low-loss dielectric medium
at microwaves frequencies, including Bluetooth and Wi-Fi
frequency bands. Thus, the human body has a large impact on
radio propagation between two devices carried by a user. The
electromagnetic (EM) waves can propagate around the human
body via (i) the penetration path that passes through the body,
and (ii) the creeping path that diffracts around the body, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. The penetration path incurs substantially
higher loss than the creeping path. It is reported in [13] that
the attenuation is approximately 120 dB at 2.4 GHz for a
penetration path of 30 cm. As a result, the creeping waves
along the body surface play a dominant role in EM wave
propagation.
Creeping waves transform the flat radiated field to the one
around a circular section, e.g., the surface of the human body.
The creeping wave propagation along the body surface consists
of clockwise and anti-clockwise paths. According to on-body
creeping wave theory [13], the electric field radiated by a
transmitting antenna at a distance d is expressed as
E =
√
η
2pi
√
PtGt
d
e−jkdW (d, r, , ht, hr)
+
√
η
2pi
√
PtGt
2pir − de
−jk(2pir−d)W (2pir − d, r, , ht, hr),
(1)
where η is the vacuum wave impedance, Pt the transmission
power, Gt the antenna gain, k the wavenumber in free space,
and r the radius of body surface. W (·) is the attenuation
function that describes the losses caused by the complex
permittivity η of the human tissue, the curvature r of the body
3surface and the distances ht, hr between the body surface and
the antennas. Note that the above analysis focuses on vertical
polarized component, while the horizontal polarized compo-
nent suffers more attenuation. Therefore, the orientations of
on-body antennas also impact greatly on the path loss.
Eq. 1 implies that the attenuation of on-body propagation
is affected by body surface change and the positions and
orientations of the transmitting and receiving antennas, while
environmental changes have little impact on on-body propaga-
tion. In particular, body motion incurs changes in body surface
curves as well as antenna positions, which in turn affects W (·)
and the interference between clockwise and anti-clockwise
propagations. Therefore, on-body propagation is quite stable
when the body remains static, but varies significantly when
the body moves.
Although the path loss of on-body propagation varies for
different antenna locations, such as wrist, chest and waist,
the above statistical characteristics always hold. Measure-
ments [14], [15] for body area network channels report that
for different on-body locations, including wrist, waist, chest,
and leg, the path loss variation is less than 4 dB when the
person is stationary, while the variation is up to 30 dB when
the person is moving.
On the contrary, when the transmitting and receiving anten-
nas are placed on different bodies with free space between
them, referred to as off-body links, the signal propagation
is governed by the antenna distance (direct path loss gain)
and dynamics of the environments (multi-path and shadowing
fading). Even if the body remains static, off-body propaga-
tion may also fluctuate due to subtle environmental changes.
Compared to on-body propagation, off-body propagation is
less sensitive to body motion as changes in body surface and
antenna orientation have little impact on it.
Based on the above observations, we can exploit the distinct
radio propagation features to discern on-body devices. Fig. 2
shows the results of a motivational experiment where each
of two users wears a COTS wristband while only one user
carries a smartphone in her pocket. The pocket is the one
nearest to the other user. The two users first stand still at
a distance of 2 m, and then walk side by side. When both
users are static, the RSS of the on-body device is more stable.
This is because on-body propagation is dominated by the
creeping path, while off-body propagation is easily affected by
environmental dynamics. When the users walk side by side,
the RSS of on-body links has a larger variance as the creeping
path is more sensitive to body motion.
To conclude, on-body propagation is dominated by creep-
ing waves, which are insensitive to environmental dynamics
but are very sensitive to body motion. On the other hand,
these features disappear when the transmitting and receiving
antennas are placed on different users separated by a distance,
as the propagation is gated by rich-multipath radio channels,
scattering and diffraction caused by the environments.
III. SECURETAG DESIGN
SecureTag leverages the characteristics of creeping waves
to improve security of on-body IoT devices. The crux of
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Fig. 2. RSS variance comparison between on- and off-body propagations.
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Fig. 3. System flow of SecureTag.
SecureTag is to construct a propagation profile to authenticate
on-body devices by decomposing RSS traces into different
levels of variations for propagation feature extraction. Fig.
3 illustrates the framework of SecureTag. It takes the RSS
time series as input, which is collected by a user’s carry-on
device, such as a smartphone. Note that many COTS wearables
(e.g., Samsung Gear Fit, Fitbit, Mio Alpha) synchronize sensor
readings with connected smartphones when the correspond-
ing smartphone applications are active. SecureTag initiates
a proactive protocol when: i) a shared secret has not been
established yet during device association, ii) devices send
control messages that disallows encryption, and iii) the shared
secret has been compromised.
At PHY, the core of SecureTag is to extract propagation
features to identify legitimate on-body transmissions. Secure-
Tag takes two steps, Signal Decomposition and Propagation
Pattern Matching, to achieve this goal.
1) Signal Decomposition. SecureTag first partitions the
traces into multiple basic segments. Then, SecureTag
decomposes each segment into multiple independent
components, and clusters them into large- and small-
scale variations. The small-scale variations are fast RSS
fluctuations caused by multi-path fading. The large-scale
variations are slow RSS fluctuations caused by obstacles
and changes in Tx-Rx distances.
2) Propagation Pattern Matching. After decomposing
RSS traces into different scales of variations, SecureTag
eliminates the impact of body motion to derive residual
variations caused by environmental dynamics, and then
matches the variation features of each segment to on/off-
body radio propagation patterns.
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Fig. 4. Signal processing procedure of multi-scale variation decomposition.
At upper layers, SecureTag operates in concert with existing
security protocols to offer defense-in-depth protection against
active attackers. Upon detecting malicious behaviors, Secure-
Tag initiates the propagation pattern check in the PHY, and
then mitigates attacks by a challenge-response protocol.
A. Signal Decomposition
The first step of SecureTag is to decompose RSS mea-
surements into multiple components. SecureTag first divides
RSS time series into segments, and then performs signal
decomposition to derive multi-scale variations.
Signal segmentation. A segment is the basic unit for pattern
matching, and its interval should be carefully selected. If
the segment interval is too long, one segment may contain
both on-body and off-body states, which may mislead pattern
matching. If the segment interval is too short, RSS samples in
one segment may not be sufficient enough to extract variation
features. SecureTag selects the shortest interval that provides
satisfactory performance. An interval of T = 20s is found to
be able to distinguish over 90% on- and off-body wearables.
Multi-scale variation decomposition. As discussed in Sec-
tion II, the composition of the RSS time series is complex, in
that signal variations are contributed by many factors. This
makes it difficult to directly extract features from RSS varia-
tions. To overcome this predicament, SecureTag decomposes
the RSS time series into multiple components.
Recall that the instantaneous RSS is comprised of multiple
components that are caused by multiple independent factors,
including Tx-Rx distance, body motion, and environmental
dynamics. These factors reveal distinct patterns in on- and off-
body propagations. We observe that these factors contribute
to different scales of variations. Specifically, Tx-Rx distance
changes are gated by the speed of human movements, and thus
lead to relatively slow RSS variations, while body motion such
as hand gestures and environmental dynamics result in fast
RSS fluctuations. Based on this observation, SecureTag aims
to extract the signal variations contributed by each of these
factors by decomposing the RSS time series into variations of
different scales. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the signal processing
procedure of multi-scale variation decomposition first sepa-
rates the RSS segment to multiple independent components,
and then groups them into large- and small-scale variations.
A direct method to derive variations of different scales is
to decompose RSS traces into multiple spectral components
using filters. However, it is difficult to identify the cut-off
frequencies for partitioning, as the spectral property of RSS
variations varies across different environments and contexts.
To address this issue, SecureTag employs single channel in-
dependent component analysis (SCICA) [16], which is widely
used in biometric signal processing. The major advantages of
SCICA are two-folds. First, it separates a multivariate signal
into independent non-gaussian components. This fits our target
of deriving multiple independent variations. Second, it requires
no prior knowledge about spectral properties of components,
which removes the need to set cut-off frequencies.
Generally, SCICA works by transforming a time series such
that the statistical dependences between the output components
are minimized. It includes three steps: embedding, separation,
and recovery.
In the embedding step, an RSS segment
r = [r(1), r(2), ..., r(T )]> is mapped into an L × K
matrix V, which is expressed as
V =

r(1) r(2) · · · r(K)
r(2) r(3) · · · r(K + 1)
...
...
. . .
...
r(L) r(L+ 1) · · · r(T )
 , (2)
where L = T − K + 1 is the embedding dimension and K
the number of consecutive delayed segments. The practical
minimum size for L is fs/fl [17], where fs denotes the
sampling frequency and fl the lowest frequency of interest
in RSS signals. SecureTag sets fl = 0.5 Hz and adopts a
larger L = d1.5 × fs/fle to capture substantial information
from noisy and heavily correlated RSS traces.
The separation step searches for a transformation matrix W
that decomposes V into multiple independent components
V =
n∑
i=1
a1u
>
1 + ...+ aLu
>
L , (3)
where W = [a1, ...,aL]−1 and {ui : ∀i} are the independent
components to be extracted. Note that we use the column
vector as the default format. In our implementation, we adopt
the FastICA algorithm [18] to derive W. FastICA has the
merits of fast and stable convergence, which is suitable to run
on resource-limited IoT devices.
FastICA treats it as an optimization problem, and iteratively
estimates W by searching the direction that maximizes the
non-Gaussianity of the projection U = [u1, ...,uL] = WV.
After deriving the transformation matrix W, the recovery
step maps U back to the measurement space using
Yi = aiu
>
i , (4)
where ui is the ith column of U. The delay matrix Yi
is projected to a time series component si by applying the
diagonal averaging [17], which is an inverse procedure of the
embedding step.
Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(c)(d) illustrate the obtained components
{si : ∀i}. The raw RSS signals are collected in an apartment
where one user walks with a smart wristband (as the on-body
wearable) and a smartphone in her pocket, while another user
walks with a wristband (as the off-body wearable). We observe
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Fig. 5. Illustration of signal decomposition.
that {si : ∀i} can be quite a few (around ten components) and
multiple components may associate with a single factor.
Based on the raw RSS signals are collected in our experi-
ments, we observe that {si : ∀i} can be quite a few (around
ten components) and multiple components may associate with
a single factor. Recall that we are interested in identifying
variations caused by direct path loss, environmental dynamics,
and body motion. Direct path loss exhibits lower frequencies
of variations than the other two factors, and can thus be
easily extracted from derived components. Though possessing
different variations, features of environmental dynamics and
body motion are harder to distinguish as both result in shad-
owing fading. Hence, SecureTag first extracts direct path loss
variations by grouping the components into two main clusters,
i.e., large-scale and small-scale variations, where large-scale
variations are contributed by direct path loss.
To derive large- and small-scale variations, SecureTag
groups variations based on agglomerative hierarchical cluster-
ing [19], which treats each component as a singleton cluster at
the beginning and then successively merges pairs of clusters
until all clusters have been merged into a single cluster. The
advantage of hierarchical clustering is that it stores interme-
diate results in the clustering procedure. For distance measure
in clustering, SecureTag employs Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW), a popular technique that computes an optimal match
between two time series with non-linear variations [20]. The
hierarchical clustering procedure successively merges clusters
or components with the smallest DTW distance. As the
spectral components of large-scale variations mainly fall into
the low frequency range due to the speed limitations of human
movement, SecureTag performs fast Fourier transform (FFT)
to each intermediate clusters and computes the low frequency
energy by summing all magnitudes in the low frequency range,
i.e., (0,1] Hz, that covers human movements. Then, the large-
scale variations cluster is set to be the earliest cluster that
maintains a certain ratio of low frequency energy to total
low frequency energy in the RSS segment. SecureTag sets
the low frequency range to (0,1] Hz. Fig. 5(e) and Fig. 5(f)
illustrate the large- and small-scale variations after clustering.
We observe that the small-scale variation of the on-body RSS
is smaller than that of the off-body RSS.
B. Propagation Pattern Matching
After applying signal decomposition, SecureTag first ex-
ploits signal fluctuations that are likely caused by body motion,
and removes them to derive residual small-scale variations.
Then, SecureTag matches the variations of an RSS segment to
on/off-body propagation pattern.
Motion-induced fluctuation removal. Recall that signal
fluctuations incurred by body motion overwhelm other on-
body variations (the walking part in Fig. 2). As we have no
knowledge of the users’ motion states, the motion-induced
signal fluctuations can be misleading in pattern matching. In
Fig. 5(e), we observe that the large-scale variation component
significantly fluctuates due to body motion, which is even
larger than the off-body large-scale variation as shown in
Fig. 5(f). To eliminate the impact of body motion, SecureTag
sanitizes large-scale variations by removing the periods that
contain motion-induced signal fluctuation with high probabil-
ity.
From existing measurements [8], [15], [21], [22] and our
empirical study, we observe that
• Body movements induce significant fluctuations of path
gain and fading. Measurement results from many studies
[8], [15], [21] have shown that signal fluctuations incurred
by body motion are several times larger than those when
wearers are static. From RSS traces of an on-body device
collected from the carry-on smartphone, we observe that
the signal variations in the hand movement period is 2-3
times larger than those in the static period.
• The frequencies of body movements fall into a low
frequency range. Most frequencies of hand gestures fall
into [0.3, 4.5] Hz [22], and the frequencies of other body
movements are even lower. We observe that most large
variations during body motion fall between 0.5 Hz and
2 Hz.
SecureTag minimizes the impact of body motion by ap-
plying a low pass filter with cut-off frequency of 0.5 Hz to
the large-scale variation component, and treats the residual
components as variations incurred by environmental dynamics.
Multi-scale variation pattern matching. So far we have
obtained residual large-scale variations and small-scale vari-
ations. We then exploit the features in these two scales of
variations to match the RSS segment to the on/off- body
propagation pattern. Due to the fact that the main on-body
6propagation form, i.e., the creeping wave, is insensitive to
environmental dynamics, we can discriminate among the prop-
agation patterns by examining the variations caused by these
two factors.
Specifically, we define a utility function that is a weighted
sum of the significance of these variations:
u = ασl + βσs, (5)
where α, β are the weights for the standard deviations σl, σs
of large- and small-scale variations, respectively.
To determine α, β, we adopt a heuristic approach by mea-
suring the standard deviations in on- and off-body traces.
The traces are collected over a short period of time (e.g.,
15 min) in different scenarios, including malls, apartments
and outdoor areas. We first compute the average standard
deviations {σ¯onl , σ¯ons } in on-body traces and {σ¯offl , σ¯offs } in off-
body traces. We allocate proportionally more weights to the
coefficient of which the standard deviations in the two traces
have a larger difference, that is,
α
β
=
σ¯onl − σ¯offl
σ¯ons − σ¯offs
. (6)
To match the RSS segment to on/off-body propagation pattern,
we compare u with a threshold as follows{
u ≥ α(σ¯onl + σ¯offl )/2 + β(σ¯ons + σ¯offs )/2 ⇒ off-body
u < α(σ¯onl + σ¯
off
l )/2 + β(σ¯
on
s + σ¯
off
s )/2 ⇒ on-body
.
(7)
C. Integration with Security Protocols
Our final protocol integrates with existing security protocols
in the upper layers to enable device authentication and defend
against active attacks. Sitting between upper-layer security
protocols and PHY signal processing, SecureTag conforms to
reasoning analogous to existing security protocols but differs
in that SecureTag takes into account the propagation patterns
to performance device authentication.
1) Authenticated Spoofing Mitigation: During device as-
sociation, an attacker may impersonate the legitimate IoT
device by broadcasting the same MAC address and even login
credentials. By thus the attack can associate with a legitimate
device and then launch spoofing attacks by injecting packets
which are completely identical to a legitimate device into the
network, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
SecureTag defends against the authenticated spoofing attack
by integrating propagation pattern check with authentication
protocol, as described below.
1) An IoT device triggers the association process by broad-
casting its ID in association request packets.
2) Another legitimate device hears the association request,
and send back an acknowledgement (ACK) frame to
request propagation pattern verification.
3) Upon receiving the propagation pattern verification re-
quest, the IoT device sends a series of empty packets.
4) The legitimate device determines whether the IoT device
is an on-body device by extracting patterns from the RSS
data of received packets according to the algorithm as
described in Section III-A and III-B.
IoT Legitimate Device Attacker
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Verification
Fig. 6. Authenticated spoofing mitigation.
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Fig. 7. Jamming and replay mitigation.
5) If the propagation pattern matches the on-body pattern,
the legitimate device deems the IoT device as an authen-
ticated device, and establishes a communication link.
2) Jamming and Replay Mitigation: An attack can launch
jamming and replay attack by equipping multiple antennas.
A multi-antenna attacker can jams the association packets
reception with one directional antenna and records the packet
with another antenna. The attacker then replays the recorded
packets to the legitimate device. After obtaining authorization
from the legitimate device, the attacker can inject its own data
into the network.
To defend against the jamming and replay attack, SecureTag
adds a propagation verification stage at the end of the associ-
ation, as illustrated in Fig. 7. As the propagation patterns of
the attacker fail to match the on-body patterns, SecureTag can
easily detect the attacker.
3) Authentication/Deauthentication Deadlock Mitigation:
There are various ways to launch Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks. A typical type of DoS attacks takes the vulnerability
before a secure link has been established. During the authen-
tication handshakes, an attacker can inject an authentication
request identical to the IoT device or an unauthenticated deau-
thentication notification, which leads to a protocol deadlock.
SecureTag allows the IoT device to send a challenge frame
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Fig. 8. Jamming and replay mitigation.
once it receives an authentication request/unauthenticated
deauthentication notification that is not sent from itself. The
legitimate device then initiates a propagation verification stage
similar to the authentication protocol, as show in Fig. 8.
IV. MICRO-BENCHMARK EXPERIMENTS
The target of micro-benchmark experiments is to evaluate
our system performance in different basic scenarios. Specifi-
cally, we evaluate our system when the user and the attacker
are in different motion states.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Implementation and Setup: We implement SecureTag
as an Android background service on a Samsung Galaxy S4
smartphone. The smartphone runs Android 4.4 firmware and
is equipped with a Bluetooth 4.0 chipset to communicate with
wearables at 2.4 GHz. The SecureTag service implemented
on the smartphone sends poll packets to connected wearables
using Android API, and log RSS measurements for analysis.
We use Fitbit Force, LifeSense Mambo, and Lumo Back
as wearables. SecureTag only runs a background service in
smartphones, and does not require any modifications to COTS
wearables. Since SecureTag relies merely on standard Blue-
tooth API in COTS devices, it can also be readily implemented
on other platforms such as iOS and Windows Phone.
Metrics. We use the following metrics to evaluate the
performance of our system.
• Attack mitigation rate. Attack mitigation rate is defined
to be the ratio of the number of attack attempts are
successfully detected and mitigated to total number of
attack attempts.
• False alarm rate. False alarm rate is the ratio of the
number of segments in which the on-body IoT device is
falsely recognized as an attacker to the total number of
segments.
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Fig. 9. Floor plan of the lab environment for benchmark experiments.
Lab Environments. This experiment is conducted in a
10 m×10 m lab, whose layout is depicted in Fig. 9. The
lab consists of 36 cubics. There were 22 students in the
lab, most of them sitting in front of their desks, with only
a few students walking around during the experiments. We
conduct experiments on different days during working hours.
We collect a total of 4.5-hour traces for analysis.
2) Wearer Motion States: This experiment involves two
volunteers Sub1 and Sub2, with each of them wearing a smart
wristband, i.e., a Fitbit Force and a LifeSense Mambo. Sub1
puts the smartphone in her pocket when not seated. Sub1 may
hold the phone, or put it in a pocket. The polling interval is
set to 200 ms. We consider the following four scenarios.
• S1: Sitting side by side. Sub1 and Sub2 sit side by side
in the lab separated by an aisle of 2 m wide.
• S2: Walking side by side. Sub1 and Sub2 walks along
the corridor outside the lab. The distance between Sub1
and Sub2 is 2 m.
• S3: Sub1 walking. Sub1 walks along the aisle while Sub2
sits in the lab.
• S4: Sub2 walking. Sub2 walks along the aisle while Sub1
sits in the lab.
TABLE I
TP AND FP RATES UNDER VARIOUS SCENARIOS.
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S4
Attack mitigation rate 0.885 1 0.981 1
False alarm rate 0.035 0.077 0.051 0.019
Results. Table I shows the attack mitigation rate and the
false alarm rate of our system under various scenarios. Se-
cureTag achieves high attack mitigation rate of over 98% for
all scenarios except S1. In S2-S4, there is at least one user
walking, and thus we can exploit both large and small-scale
variations to recognize the off-body attacker. The challenging
scenario is S1 where both users are stationary. In this scenario,
the small-scale variations for Sub2’s device are small, and thus
are easily recognized as on-body propagation. In real cases,
8the chance is rare for a person to continuously remain static,
and thus SecureTag can still achieve a high detection accuracy.
Under all scenarios, the amount of legitimate traffic are
falsely recognized as attack attempts with rates of less than
8%. The false alarm rates in different scenarios have the
following relation: S4 < S1 < S3 < S2. It reveals that when
the wearer remains stationary, it is easier to discern on-body
devices. This is because when the wearer walks, the hand and
leg movement induced fluctuations cannot be completely re-
moved, which compromises the propagation pattern matching
in S2 and S3.
In the following section, we conduct extensive experiments
to validate SecureTag in real environments.
V. EVALUATION IN REAL ENVIRONMENTS
In this section, we evaluate SecureTag in real environments
with uncontrolled body motion. The experiments involve 12
volunteer subjects, and are conducted in apartments, malls,
and outdoor areas.
TABLE II
BASIC INFORMATION OF VOLUNTEER SUBJECTS.
Sub. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Sex F F F F F M M M M M M M
Age 21 26 50 59 81 17 22 25 26 53 54 61
A. Experimental Setup
1) Enrolled Participants: We invite 12 volunteers, whose
basic information is listed in Table II, to participate in the
experiments. The subjects include a teenager, five college
students, five middle-aged people, and an elderly person. We
specifically select subjects to cover different age groups and
both genders. These subjects normally have different body
motion patterns. The elderly moves more slowly while younger
people move faster and are more active. The subjects also vary
in height and weight, ranging from 5 ft to 6 ft and 100 lbs to
190 lbs, respectively. The creeping wave propagations might
show different patterns on people of different shapes. We
intend to see whether body motion and shape affect the
experimental results.
2) Methodology: To validate SecureTag in real cases, we do
not control wearers’ movements as in controlled experiments.
We only ask volunteers to wear the devices, and then the wear-
ers continue their daily activities in different environments.
For example, in apartments, wearers may do housework, rest,
and dine as usual; while in malls, wearers walk and pick up
goods for shopping. Wearers are free to talk and make gestures
during the experiments. Unless otherwise stated, volunteers
wear the Fitbit Force or LifeSense Mambo on their wrists as
the wearables, and place the smartphone in a pocket or hold
it.
B. Evaluation in Different Scenarios
People wear devices in many different indoor and outdoor
areas. Indoor propagations significantly differ from outdoor
propagations, in terms of multi-path fading, shadowing, and
direct path loss. Moreover, the propagation patterns in different
indoor environments (e.g., different layouts and user densities)
are also versatile. It is thus important to evaluate the robustness
of SecureTag in various environments. We study the following
three representative scenarios. In each environment, two sub-
jects have wearables on and one of them carries a smartphone.
• Residential environment. We test our system in three
different-sized (i.e., 1000 ft, 1300 ft, and 1600 ft2)
apartments. 2-6 other people including family members
and visitors are co-located in the apartment. Wearers rest
on couch, watch TV, walk, cook, and clean floors during
our tests.
• Mall environment. This environment includes a small-
size supermarket (about 30 ft × 50 ft) and a large shop-
ping mall. The mall environments are very dynamic, with
people frequently passing by. The wearers go shopping
together, with a series of activities like walking, browsing,
and picking up the goods involved.
• Outdoor environment. The outdoor environment in-
cludes a plaza and a walkway. In the plaza, the two
wearers wander randomly, while in the walkway, the
two wearers walk side-by-side along the road. In both
cases, the wearers may chat with each other while making
occasional gestures.
We conduct the experiments over 14 different days, and
collect RSS traces of 25.01 hours, with 10 hours in the
residential environment, 6.26 hours in the mall environment,
and 8.75 hours in the outdoor environment.
1) Results: We evaluate the robustness of SecureTag in
different environments in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. The results show
that the attack mitigation and false alarm rates are similar over
different environments when the RSS sample period ranges
from 100 ms to 300 ms, and the segment interval is no larger
than 30s.
Fig. 10 plots the attack mitigation and false alarm rates
of SecureTag under various RSS sample periods, where
the segment interval is fixed to 20 s. Higher sample rates
can provide finer-grained propagation information. SecureTag
achieves similar performance in the three environments. We
observe that for the sample rate of 100-200 ms, the attack
mitigation rate is higher than 94.8%, and the false alarm rate
is as low as below 7.4%. On-body IoT devices are likely to
be classified as attackers when the sample period is larger
than 400 ms, as the small-scale variations are mistakenly
recognized as large-scale variations with high probability due
to low RSS granularity. The results indicate that SecureTag
performs well with a reasonable sample period of less than
300 ms.
Then, we evaluate the performance of SecureTag under
various segment intervals in Fig. 11, where the sample period
is set to 200 ms. The false alarm rate is insensitive to variations
in segment intervals, and remains as low as below 7%; while
for the outdoor scenario, the attack mitigation rate drops lower
than 90% when the segment interval goes over 30 s. This is
because the off-body pattern is more complex than the on-body
pattern, which increases the difficulty to precisely decompose
longer off-body RSS time series. Besides, the optimal segment
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Fig. 10. Attack mitigation and false alarm rates under various RSS sample periods in different environments.
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Fig. 11. Attack mitigation and false alarm rates under various segment intervals in different environments.
interval that offers the lowest FP rate in the figure is 20 s, as
the RSS samples in the segments with intervals less than 20 s
are insufficient to perform pattern matching.
C. Whole-Day Evaluation
1) Setup: We evaluate SecureTag for whole-day (3-5 hours)
activities. In each experiment set, two co-located subjects (e.g.,
colleagues in the same office, hang-out friends) wear wearable
devices and one of them carries the smartphone that collects
the RSS traces. The wearers perform their daily activities
as usual, including hanging out in coffee shops, shopping,
driving, walking, dining, doing housework, office working, etc.
The evaluation lasts 12 days, with 51.46-hour traces in total
from 12 subjects.
2) Results: Fig. 12 presents the attack mitigation and false
alarm rates for all subjects. The RSS sample period and
segment interval are set to 200 ms and 20 s. SecureTag
achieves the average attack mitigation and false alarm rates of
96.13% and 5.64%, respectively. The worst attack mitigation
and false alarm rates are 85.52% and 11.68%, which validate
the effectiveness of SecureTag across different subjects.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the whole-day performance under
different RSS sample periods and segment intervals. Fig. 13
shows that for the sample rate of 100-200 ms, the attack
mitigation rate is as high as over 95.2%, and the false alarm
rate is lower than 6.9%. In Fig. 14, we observe that when the
segment interval is shorter 30 s, the attack mitigation rate as
high as over 95.2%, and the false alarm rate remains as low as
below 6%. The results are consistent with Fig. 10 and Fig. 11,
and demonstrate that the performance of SecureTag remains
stable for both short and long-term activities.
D. Performance For Different Wearing Positions
Different positions on the body affect the radio propagations
of wearables. We evaluate the performance for wearables
at different positions. We select three typical positions for
wearables, i.e., neck (smart necklace), wrist (smart wrist-
band/watch), and waist (smart waistband). In our experiments,
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Subject
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A
tta
ck
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
ra
te
(a) Attack mitigation rate.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Subject
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Fa
lse
 a
la
rm
 ra
te
(b) False alarm rate.
Fig. 12. Whole-day performance for different subjects.
subjects wear a LifeSense Mambo around the neck to emulate
a smart necklace, a Fitbit Force on the wrist, and one Lumo
Back around the waist, as shown in Fig. 15(a). Two co-
located subjects are involved in this experiment to wear on-
and off-body devices. Subjects perform their daily activities
as described in the whole-day evaluation.
Fig. 15(b) shows that the detailed signal variations at
different positions are different, while the main feature still
stands: on-body propagation is very stable when the wearer is
static, yet varies significantly when the wearer moves. Table III
summarizes the results. SecureTag achieves 97.31%± 0.74%
attack mitigation rate and 7.29% ± 2.26% false alarm rate,
which validate its robustness against different wearing posi-
tions.
TABLE III
TP AND FP RATES FOR DIFFERENT POSITIONS.
Position Neck Waist Wrist
Attack mitigation rate 0.9804 0.9808 0.9657
False alarm rate 0.0955 0.0503 0.0588
VI. DISCUSSION
Eavesdropping attack. The eavesdropping attack can be
performed by a nearby passive receiver, who overhears the
communication packets sent by the legitimate device and the
IoT device. The scope of SecureTag is to provide protection
against active attackers who perform attacks such as DoS or
spoofing attacks by actively injecting unauthorized packets
into the network. Although SecureTag does not explicitly
prevent the eavesdropping attack, it can be mitigated by
incorporating with upper-layer encryption protocols. In partic-
ular, SecureTag can secure the initial handshake between two
legitimate devices during authentication. Then, the legitimate
devices start the encryption protocol in the upper layer to
secure the following data packets.
Energy consumption. We log the battery life of Fitbit
Force during our experiments to estimate energy consumption.
We connect the Fitbit to a Samsung S4 using the SecureTag
service, and observe that the fully-charged Fitbit lasts 10
days, during which the app collects RSS traces of 51 hours.
This suggests that we can expect a battery life of several
days when SecureTag is incorporated with the Fitbit app. For
other wearables such as the Mio heart rate watch, the energy
consumption would be even lower due to the short active
periods.
Smartphone placements. Similar to many smartphone-
based approaches [4], [6], [7], [23], we assume that each
wearer carries a dedicated smartphone or places it nearby (e.g.,
on the wearer’s desk only tens of centimeters away). When
the smartphone is off-body, it may mistakenly recognize on-
body wearables as off-body devices. To address this issue, the
smartphone can incorporate a self on-body checking scheme
that detects whether the device itself is on-body using motion
sensors, e.g., [4]. It is noteworthy that SecureTag applies
to other user-dedicated devices like smartwatches or user-
verification IoT device [24], which are worn by users most
of the time.
VII. RELATED WORK
Sensor-based user and on-body authentication. The
prevalence of smart devices has spurred growing attempts
and extensive efforts in developing user recognition systems
for new applications and human-device interactions. Specific
sensors, including bioimpedance sensor [24] and capacitive
touch sensor [25], are widely used to discern which devices are
on a certain body. These systems capture individual differences
using different sensors, and build the basis for automatic
user verification, synchronization and profile loading. Instead
of using dedicated sensors, Ren et al. [4] and Srivastava
et al. [26] consider on-body smartphones as identifiers for
wearers, and realize the above goals by detecting devices that
are on the same body carrying a smartphone. In particular,
motion sensors are used to check if devices share similar
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Fig. 13. Whole-day performance under various sample periods.
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Fig. 14. Whole-day performance under various segment intervals.
footstep patterns when the wearer walks. Xu et al. [6] take
one step further by securing on-body channels based on a
user’s gait patterns. However, motion sensor based approaches
are limited to walking scenarios and fitness related wearables.
Different from these systems, SecureTag aims to bring the
abilities of automatic user verification, synchronization and
profile loading to general COTS wearables using their built-
in wireless chipsets, which are equipped in most commercial
fitness, healthcare, and cognitive wearables of versatile form
factors.
Auxiliary channel based authentication. The shared se-
crets can be generated from user interactions, auxiliary chan-
nels, or authenticated with user actions or auxiliary channel.
Examples of the former include gesture-based authentica-
tion [27], [28] that encodes authentication information as
gestures defined by authenticators or users, and the techniques
that require users to simultaneously provide the same draw-
ings [29] or shaking trajectories [30]. The auxiliary channel
based approaches leverage a special channel to create shared
secrets. Many studies use ambient environments, such as
ambient sound [31], [32], or a combination of multiple envi-
ronments [33] as the proof of physical proximity. The auxiliary
channel itself is also leveraged as the source to generate shared
secrets. Normally, the two devices send messages to each
other within a short time to measure the channel between
them. Electromyography (EMG) sensors are leveraged in [34]
to capture the electrical activities caused by human muscle
contractions, which are encoded into secret bits to pair devices
in contact with one hand. Qiao et al. [35] use the frequency
shapes of the wireless channel between two devices to generate
secret bits. Similarly, Liu et al. [36] use the channel sate
information (CSI) as shared secrets.
Motion tracking using wireless signals. Another body of
related work is motion tracking using wireless signals. These
studies exploit body radio reflection patterns for body motion
tracking or gesture recognition [37]–[39], activity discrimina-
tion [40], and speech recognition [41]. These systems require
Wi-Fi monitors [39]–[41] or even multi-antenna systems [37],
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Fig. 15. Experiment setup of different wearing positions. The subject wears
three different wearables at neck, waist, and wrist, and carries a smartphone
in pocket.
[38] to acquire fine-grained channel information (e.g., CSI).
However, They cannot be applied to wearable devices as most
COTS wearables adopt Bluetooth for energy-efficient commu-
nications. In wearable systems, only low rate (<10 pkt/s) RSS
traces are available.
Body-area network (BAN) channel characterization.
Many existing measurements have studied the propagation
model for on-body channels [8], [11], [13], [15], [21], [46].
These studies suggest that there exists substantial differences
in on-body and off-body propagations. Their measurement
results indicate that it is feasible to use radio propagations
to distinguish between on-body and off-body devices.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents SecureTag, a low hardware cost ap-
proach for improve security protection for on-body IoT devices
by extracting the distinct creeping wave propagation features.
The insight is that on-body radio waves propagate mainly in
the form of creeping waves, which have unique characteristics
reflected in RSS variations. We demonstrate the generality of
SecureTag by evaluating it using different COTS wearables.
The experiments are conducted on 12 subjects of different
age groups, and the environments cover a lab, an office,
apartments, malls, coffee shops, plazas, walk ways, and so
on. The results show SecureTag is able to mitigate 96.13%
of active attack attempts while at the same time triggering
false alarms on merely 5.64% of legitimate traffic. SecureTag
is robust for devices worn in different positions, including the
neck, wrist, and waist.
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